Quantum computing is often framed as a future cybersecurity problem. That framing is too narrow. The more relevant question for organizations today is not whether quantum systems will disrupt modern cryptography, but whether security leaders are paying attention early enough to understand where the risk will emerge and how long it will take to respond.

Cybersecurity risk does not evolve in isolation. Advances in artificial intelligence, ransomware operations, and quantum computing are unfolding in parallel, reshaping how organizations approach long-term resilience.

Much of today’s digital trust model relies on public-key cryptography, including Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). These algorithms secure communications, validate identities, and protect transactions across enterprise environments.

Once sufficiently advanced, however, quantum computers could break these cryptographic schemes using algorithms such as Shor’s, which enables a quantum computer to efficiently factor large numbers and solve discrete logarithms, rendering RSA and ECC encryption ineffective. A sufficiently advanced quantum computer could eventually undermine these protections, requiring organizations to reassess how they secure data and maintain trust.

Standards like the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)have finalized post-quantum cryptographic frameworks to guide this transition. While adoption will take time, these developments signal that preparation is already underway.

It is worth noting that quantum risk is not yet mature enough to be on the immediate radar of most cybercriminal groups. Implementing quantum capabilities requires significant resources and expertise that few non-state actors currently possess. However, a growing number of private companies are actively investing in quantum research, accelerating the timeline in ways that are difficult to predict. Decision-makers cannot afford to wait for a clear inflection point.

The reality of ‘harvest now, decrypt later’

A more immediate concern is the growing “harvest now, decrypt later” model due to the use of quantum computing. In these scenarios, adversaries collect encrypted data today with the expectation that it may be decrypted in the future as quantum capabilities mature.

Guidance from agencies such as the National Security Agency (NSA) has identified post-quantum cryptography as a priority, with broader government guidance warning that adversaries may already be collecting encrypted data today with the intent to decrypt it in the future.

For example, encrypted financial transactions or proprietary research and development data intercepted today could remain exposed years later if protections are not updated in time. The lifespan of sensitive data often exceeds the lifespan of the cryptographic methods protecting it. In my experience, banks and financial institutions are particularly exposed here; many rely on international cryptographic protocols they do not control, meaning they cannot unilaterally update their own security posture to guard against this risk.

This also intersects with how ransomware operations have evolved. Attackers are already prioritizing data exfiltration and extortion over encryption alone. If confidence in encryption declines over time, the value of stolen data may increase, potentially making extortion more effective. Practically speaking, quantum capabilities are most likely to change ransomware and data-theft tactics first by enabling the retroactive decryption of previously harvested data, a risk that organizations holding sensitive long-term records, such as those in finance, health care, and defense, should be monitoring most closely.

A converging threat landscape

Quantum risk is emerging alongside broader shifts in attacker capability.

Adversaries are beginning to incorporate AI-driven tools to improve efficiency across reconnaissance, malware development, and social engineering. These capabilities can reduce the time between vulnerability discovery and exploitation, limiting the window organizations have to respond. In a sense, threat actors are already testing organizational defenses, probing entry points and checking barriers much like a guard checking an entrance. Leaving any door open, whether through outdated cryptography or poor intelligence practices, creates exploitable exposure.

At the same time, nation-state actors are more likely to be early adopters of advanced capabilities, including potential future quantum decryption. If a state-level actor were to successfully implement a quantum algorithm against a decryption system, the consequences could be catastrophic, breaking protections that entire industries depend on. The threat, if it materializes, will almost certainly originate from a nation-state first.

Taken together, these trends reinforce that quantum risk should be viewed as part of a broader shift in the threat landscape, rather than as a standalone issue.

What security leaders should focus on now

For security leaders, the challenge is balancing urgency with realism. Organizations cannot fully “quantum-proof” their environments today, and overcorrecting too early introduces operational risk. At the same time, waiting for a clear tipping point is risky given the time required to transition cryptographic systems across complex environments.

The priority now is twofold: building visibility into where and how cryptography is used, and investing in threat intelligence.

Security teams should focus on:

• Understanding where cryptography is embedded across systems and applications
• Identifying dependencies on algorithms that may be vulnerable in the future
• Engaging vendors on post-quantum readiness
• Prioritizing data that requires long-term confidentiality
• Staying current on the latest quantum research and NIST post-quantum standards, not to act immediately, but to understand when action becomes necessary

There is a mindset shift that every CISO needs to internalize: great security policies are necessary, but they are not sufficient. Strong security depends on strong intelligence. Without visibility into external threats, organizations can’t fully understand what they need to defend against or how to protect themselves. Security and intelligence are not separate disciplines, they are interdependent. Organizations that invest in strong cryptographic hygiene but neglect external threat awareness will find themselves reacting to threats they never saw coming.

Without this level of visibility and intelligence, organizations may not have a clear understanding of where future exposure exists.

Preparing for a post-quantum future

There are signs that the path forward is becoming clearer. NIST’s post-quantum standards provide a foundation for planning and modernization, even if widespread adoption will take time.

Organizations do not need to replace all cryptography immediately. However, they should begin taking practical steps now, including inventorying cryptographic dependencies, incorporating crypto-agility into long-term planning, and aligning security strategies with emerging standards.

The transition to a post-quantum environment will be gradual and will unfold alongside broader changes in the threat landscape. CEOs and board-level leaders should also be aware of what is happening in quantum computing, not to drive technical decisions, but to ensure the organization is asking the right questions and allocating resources appropriately. Quantum risk is not solely a CISO problem; it is a business continuity issue.