Sovereignty is logically viewed through the prism of national borders, a notion that is simple in character but exceedingly complex in the digital era, a complexity that only grows when taken to space, where it’s become a celestial challenge that nations are having to grapple with in real time.

One angle of this challenge is playing out over satellite constellations. Satellites have been a point of national pride for decades, ushering in the space race that saw the U.S. and the Soviet Union (USSR) spend unlimited finances and untold lives on being the first to have a metal object orbit overhead.

That race also ushered in the need for rules on space sovereignty, which evolved into the United Nations-housed Outer Space Treaty and was adopted in 1966. Article II of that treaty states: “Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.”

Sixty years later, and that phrase now seems quaint. Not because nations have overtly attempted to appropriate outer space or the physical bodies rotating in that space, but because control of the uncontrollable has shifted toward satellites occupying those locations, and more specifically, which nations control those satellites.

There are approximately 17,000 “satellites” orbiting the Earth at various heights and speeds. Those are basically grouped into three orbiting categories:

• Geostationary orbit (GEO) at around 22,000 miles at a speed that matches the speed of the Earth’s rotation, which means those GEO satellites maintain a single position relative to the Earth. This orbit is typically used for weather data, broadcast television, and some low-data communications.
• Medium-Earth orbit (MEO) between 3,100 miles and 12,000 miles above Earth has typically been the home of GPS and navigation-focused services.
• Low-Earth orbit (LEO) between 100 miles and 1,200 miles, which is the most densely populated region and home to rapidly expanding connectivity services like SpaceX’s Starlink and Amazon’s Leo.

Satellite control

While the orbiting location of these satellites is directly tied to their capabilities, there is a growing focus on the “location” of those entities that are either launching satellites into space or of the entities that control the actual satellites.

The U.S. is the dominant player based on its long-standing NASA program, which for most of its history tagged each satellite to specific U.S. government control. Reports indicate that around 75% of satellites in orbit are from the U.S. or U.S.-based entities.

But, most of those currently orbiting satellites are controlled by private companies like SpaceX that have taken it upon themselves to launch thousands of communication satellites into space, with a growing focus on using their own launch vehicles. The extent of SpaceX’s interest in space was outlandishly highlighted by the company recently gaining Federal Communications Commission (FCC) approval to launch up to one million satellites, each of which would operate as part of an “orbital data center system” orbiting at an altitude of between 310 miles and 1,240 miles and be “within orbital shells spanning up to 31 miles (50 km) each.”

Most of the remaining 25% of orbiting satellites are from China and the Commonwealth of Independent States (Russia), with the latter being noted for rapidly expanding its satellite efforts. Analysys Mason noted in a recent report that a handful of China-based companies have overseen more than 100 launches that have placed thousands of satellites into various orbits.

Analysys Mason’s Christopher Baugh, in a separate report tied to LEO deployments, summed up the impact of this regional dominance, noting “LEO sovereignty is now closely tied to national interests; yet LEO viability can still appear distant given technical, financial, and regulatory considerations.”

EU at the center of concern

This current sovereignty discrepancy is driving concern for those outside of the big three, with analysts pointing to the biggest concern coming from the European Union, which could provide regional satellite operators with an opportunity.

“The real-time effects of overdependence on a single operator and the network are becoming clear. This implies operational and legal control, not necessarily domestically built infrastructure or industrial independence,” ABI Research Principal Analyst Andrew Cavalier noted in a recent report. “In this way, geostationary Earth orbit (GEO) and multi-orbit operators like Société Européenne des Satellites (SES), Astranis, Telesat, Eutelsat-OneWeb are distinctive and commercially viable in a market now largely dominated by SpaceX, where they can sell a new tier of sovereignty as a product even when manufacturing is done elsewhere.”

One of those looking to take advantage of that opportunity is Paris-based Eutelsat. The long-standing firm currently counts more than 600 LEO and 31 GEO satellites in orbit.

Eutelsat CEO Jean-François Fallacher told an audience during a keynote at the recent Mobile World Congress (MWC) event that a LEO constellation is “technology Europe should master, and technology on which we cannot be dependent [on] from other nations. It's true that the current geopolitical environment is pushing us even more toward that.”

Fallacher did claim a tailwind in Eutelsat’s efforts toward constructing a viable European alternative, a breeze tied to the recent ability for outside nations to control satellite connectivity within the EU.

“[With the] geopolitical situation, people realize … a concept of sovereignty can be sometimes extremely concrete when one of our competitors – that I will not name here – decides to cut the services of our given country, you know that marks the spirit and [therefore] people realize what it means being dependent,” Fallacher said, brazenly hinting at Elon Musk-led SpaceX’s management of Starlink coverage in Ukraine.

That “dependent” need was recently highlighted when Eutelsat was prevented from selling terrestrial parts of its satellite ground network architecture.

“These satellite constellations are not, let's say, delivering broadband services by themselves. They need a field of fixed antennas, and we have 41 fields of eight to 12 huge antennas across all continents,” Fallacher said. “This is … interconnected by a huge,

redundant fiber network. And we were about to sell that, and we got the no-go from our government because they are considering that we are a strategic object for Europe, that we are a sovereign object, and they simply didn't want a fund to invest in that, probably could have sold back these assets.”

Battling operational challenges

Fallacher’s financial note also points to overhanging operational challenges for sovereign-focused satellite efforts, something Cavalier said continues to serve operational headwinds.

“The irony of the sovereignty push is that it cuts both ways for the incumbent market,” Cavalier wrote. “On one hand, single GEO satellites can be dedicated to single customers with specific requirements, enabling dedicated capacity, security, and control with no ‘shared’ infrastructure.”

Cavalier explained that this could include GEO operators providing “GEO-slicing,” which he described basically as a satellite version of traditional network slicing.

“In theory … effectively carving out a slice of their GEO network as a logically isolated, customer-controlled environment with local infrastructure, encryption, dedicated spectrum, and local subsidiaries, functionally delivering sovereignty without outright customer ownership,” Cavalier wrote.

However, current GEO models could make it difficult for such services to meet future sovereignty requirements.

“On the other hand, the push toward dedicated national space assets will threaten the long-standing shared-capacity wholesale model that GEO operators have long relied on. Leasing capacity may no longer be viewed as enough, and another layer of control is desired,” Cavalier added. “Furthermore, a managed service agreement … may not be perceived as actual control, where owning the satellite outright eliminates dependency.”

Cavalier noted this has seen incumbent GEO players “trying to occupy a middle-tier in the sovereignty market, more sovereign than leasing capacity on a shared satellite, but less sovereign than owning a dedicated asset. This will introduce cost constraints on incumbent business models as they will now have to grapple with a market that is no longer shopping for a leased or shared asset, breaking the revenue streams of selling unused transponders on satellites.”

Eutelsat’s Fallacher outlined that, at least from an EU angle, there needs to be more cooperation from the region to build scale if it truly wants to tackle this sovereignty challenge.

“We have in our business, which is these LEO constellations, giants in front of us. I mean American giants, Chinese giants, and [as such] we need scale in Europe,” Fallacher said. “And the fact is, I'm not blaming [anyone]. I'm French. I'm European by nature. I spent all my career in different countries in Europe: Spain, Romania, [and] Poland, so I'm deeply European, but still, what I see on a daily basis is that we are a collection of 27 countries; we are not, unfortunately, yet, behaving like one country.

“There is always a temptation of what I call fragmentation. There is always a temptation that each of us is willing or wanting to build it own local, national [infrastructure]. I understand that temptation. But I believe it would be a big pitfall, and that's why we are really advocating to get all the European countries united … to have these sovereign constellations striving in the future.”

This article first appeared in the SDxCentral Sovereignty Supplement.

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